Tuncay Unal, PhD
tuncay.unal@gc4ss.org

Introduction

In the United States, numerous laws and regulations are enacted each year at the federal, state, and local levels, all of which play active roles in shaping public policy (Anderson, 2003). Birkland (2001) defines public policy as a government’s decision to act or not act through laws, regulations, or official rulings. Because public policies inherently distribute benefits and burdens unevenly, they rarely improve outcomes for all groups equally.

Given the volume and complexity of U.S. public policies, scholars have developed various typologies to categorise them. While these frameworks are useful for organising and analysing policies, none fully captures the substance or diversity of policy content, limiting their ability to support broad generalisations (Anderson, 2003). As Birkland (2001) notes, no single classification system is universally applicable; instead, understanding the strengths and limitations of different typologies helps explain how policies are developed and what outcomes they may produce.

Public Policy Typologies

Anderson (2003) argues that an important initial step in analysing public policy is distinguishing between substantive and procedural policies. Substantive policies define what the government intends to do, whereas procedural policies specify how actions will be carried out and which actors will be responsible for implementation.

While substantive policies directly distribute benefits and costs, creating winners and losers, procedural policies can also have significant effects. According to Anderson, decisions about policy procedures, including who is authorised to act and how decisions are implemented, often shape actual outcomes as much as the policy goals themselves.

Distributive Policies

Birkland (2001) describes distributive policies as those that provide benefits to specific segments of the population—such as individuals, interest groups, corporations, or communities—and that often involve allocating public resources in ways that resemble the privatisation of public goods. Although competition for benefits may occur in some cases, distributive policies generally do not involve direct conflict among beneficiaries. Instead, local governments typically seek federal support for their own projects without opposing similar efforts by others. As a result, these policies tend to generate political support without clear opposition, creating the appearance of winners without identifiable losers, even though the broader public ultimately bears the cost (Anderson, 2003).

Hayes (1978) argues that success for interest groups in distributive policymaking depends on maintaining a non–zero-sum environment among active participants while excluding unorganized or less powerful actors from the process. Common examples of distributive policies include government spending on welfare programs, transportation infrastructure, public education, and public safety (Wikipedia, 2007).

Members of Congress frequently engage in negotiations to secure federal funding for projects in their districts and often highlight these efforts during reelection campaigns as evidence of their effectiveness in delivering resources from Washington (Birkland, 2001). Due to their popularity and low levels of controversy, distributive policies occur more frequently than other policy types. Shull (1983) notes that distributive policies were particularly dominant in the nineteenth century and, based on his analysis of policies between 1950 and 1975, accounted for approximately 42 percent of enacted policies.

Lowi (1970) observes that because distributive policies emphasize benefits while dispersing costs across general revenues, policymakers can separate individual funding decisions from broader budgetary constraints. In the short term, this allows decision makers to approach distributive policymaking as though resources were effectively unlimited.

Regulatory Policies

Regulatory policies, as defined by Anderson (2003), seek to constrain individual and group behavior by limiting discretion and freedom, distinguishing them from distributive policies, which expand access to benefits. Many regulatory policies address criminal conduct and are most effective where acceptable behavior can be clearly specified and violations can be sanctioned through fines or penalties (Wikipedia, 2007).

Unlike distributive policies, regulatory policymaking typically generates conflict among competing groups, producing clear winners and losers, though outcomes often fall short of initial demands (Anderson, 2003). Birkland (2001) identifies two main types of regulatory policy: competitive regulation, which restricts market entry by favoring selected providers, and protective regulation, which seeks to shield the public from harmful private activities. While competitive regulatory policies are often developed with limited public scrutiny, protective regulatory policies tend to be more controversial due to business resistance and are shaped through negotiation and compromise, with Congress acting as a mediator between regulatory agencies and private interests.

Lowi (1970) notes that regulatory policy environments are generally more decentralised, pluralistic, and dynamic than those surrounding distributive policies.

Redistributive Policies

Redistributive policies arise when pressure for change produces direct redistributive effects and provokes opposition from powerful interests, often leading Congress to respond with symbolic or discretionary legislation rather than substantive reform (Hayes, 1978). Birkland (2001) characterises redistributive policymaking as highly controversial, involving extensive government intervention and intense conflict among organised interests that complicate policy change.

These policies seek to reallocate wealth, property, or rights across social or racial groups, producing immediate and tangible effects (Hayes, 1978). Instruments such as tax policies, subsidies, and price supports directly transfer resources among groups, thereby reshaping income distribution. While redistributive policies often benefit lower-income populations, political incentives to pursue such policies depend heavily on leaders’ preferences and electoral considerations (Saving, 1997).

Because redistributive policies require less powerful groups to overcome resistance from stronger interests, they are difficult both to enact and sustain (Birkland, 2001; Anderson, 2003). In the United States, these policies are especially contentious, frequently polarising liberals and conservatives and placing legislators in electorally disadvantageous positions, which helps explain their relative rarity (Hayes, 1978).

Lowi (1970) argues that redistributive policies generate class-based politics and operate within a structured, separation-of-powers framework, in contrast to the committee-centred nature of distributive policies. Shull (1983) further distinguishes policy types by stability, visibility, and ideological conflict, noting that policies with broad, zero-sum impacts are typically redistributive, whereas distributive and regulatory policies involve narrower, more targeted effects.

Constituent Policies

Constituent policies focus on creating or restructuring executive institutions and redistributing power within and among government bodies (Hayes, 1978). Because they generate relatively low levels of conflict, these policies are particularly susceptible to executive influence (Spitzer, 1983). Lowi (1972) defines constituent policies as those governing the internal allocation of authority within government and notes that they are typically shaped by elite politics and embedded within executive bureaucracies.

These policies encompass broad governmental functions, including national security, foreign affairs, defence, intelligence, diplomacy, and the major administrative agencies (California State University, 2007). Holzinger (1998) emphasises that constituent policies structure power relationships across levels of government and are often formulated within institutions themselves, making them among the most representative yet least visible policy types.

Despite their significance, constituent policies are frequently overlooked because they are embedded within other policy domains, contributing to their conceptual ambiguity (Wyszomirski, 1998). Ironically, these policies deserve greater attention, as they establish the institutional frameworks that generate political conflict. Lowi (1972) further argues that constituent policies can engage public interest when they introduce large-scale structural changes—such as electoral reforms—that reshape political relationships without explicitly defining social classes.

In recent decades, constituent policies have become increasingly prominent, as illustrated by reforms related to campaign finance, term limits, lobbying, balanced budgets, and government reorganisation. Wyszomirski (1998) attributes this trend in part to the growing political engagement of nonprofit organisations, which have increasingly mobilised their members and shifted policy arenas toward constituent concerns.

Conclusion

Public policy cannot be fully explained by a single typology, as policies vary widely in purpose, structure, and effect. As Birkland (2001) notes, policy frameworks are best understood as analytical tools that help explain how decisions are made rather than as prescriptions for what policies ought to be. From a rationalist perspective, the quality of a policy is often judged by its capacity to address a problem effectively; however, what constitutes a “better” policy ultimately depends on underlying goals and value orientations.

Lowi (1972) offers a normative framework for evaluating public policy by examining its relationship to democratic governance. He argues that if transparency and public participation are central democratic values, certain policy types are more compatible with these goals than others. Distributive policies, which tend to operate through narrow benefits and limited visibility, should be minimised because they restrict broad public engagement. In political systems with a strong presidency, Lowi suggests that regulatory policies may be preferable, as they shift decision-making to Congress and stimulate interest-group participation. In the absence of strong executive leadership, regulatory policies linked to treaties or executive agreements may serve a similar function.

Lowi further contends that strengthening democratic accountability and national political parties may require greater reliance on constituent policies, which reshape institutional structures and redistribute authority within government. Policies addressing issues such as monopolies, electoral systems, or large-scale public information campaigns exemplify how constituent policies can influence democratic capacity by redefining political relationships rather than distributing immediate material benefits. Taken together, these perspectives highlight that policy effectiveness should be evaluated not only by outcomes, but also by how policies shape democratic processes and governance structures (Birkland, 2001; Lowi, 1972).

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